C.T. is a Key to Pick a Popular Policy |Precise Proper Powerful Pivotal Political | |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Condorcet Tally  **Problem 1: Groups often struggle  to find the Center of opinion.**  pw Blur USM 600pw Blur USM 600  “*Our Center   is near me.” C* C**?**  *?*  *“Is it here?*   *Is it here?”*  *“le Centre C* C**?** *c'est moi !"*  Goals: A Policy with Wide Appeal  A **plurality** or runoff winner gets no votes from the  losing side and doesn't need to please those voters.  But a **Condorcet Tally, CT,** rewards wider popularity.  To win, a policy must top each rival, **one-against-one**.  It gets a majority from voters on the center **and right** over any leftish policy. At the same time, voters on the  **left and** center rank it over each right-wing policy. **All sides** rank it over narrowly-centrist policies. In this place, every voter is “obtainable” and valuable2, 3.  **A Chair with Balanced Support**  **CT can elect a chairperson or a few reps** to serve as **central** **swing voters** between the factions on a council. To win, a candidate needs to earn wide-spread support. This gives her strong incentives to help the whole council balance its process and policies.  >>>>> OVER |  | **More Merits of a Condorcet Tallies Tally, CT.**  **Choice ballots:** Rank all the options on one ballot.so **Simplify** the old rules of order and **speed up** voting. **Reduce agenda effects**, from errors and **gridlock**,  to “free-rider” and “wrecking” amendments. page 33  **No split-vote** worries as duplicates don't help or hurt each other.2b An ad hoc majority can rank all of their favorites over the other options. Ballots from all voters help decide which one of the majority’s favorites wins.  **A** **balanced policy** tends to be **stable** and settled..2  Yet a balanced process can **calm** some fears about reviewing and **changing** a good policy to improve it. These save time and build respect for democracy.  **How It Works**  The **sports** **analogy** is a “round-robin tournament.” A player has one contest against each current rival. If she wins all her tests, she wins the tournament.  Each voting test sorts all the ballots into two piles. If you rank option K over L, your ballot goes to K.  The option that gets the most ballots wins this test. If one wins all its tests, it wins the Condorcet Tally.  A B  **C**  D E  C tops A, C > B, C > D, C > E  K L  ⭮  M  But in a rare, “voting cycle,” majorities rank  K > L, L > M, and M > K. **RCV** breaks ties.  **Ranked Choice Voting**was the first handout. It too has desirable helpful rewarding valuable effects, incentives and uses. 31. |  | A Less Rigged Agenda *Now!*  Some meetings concoct a policy by a series of yes-no choices, with or without rules of order, agendas or votes. An early proposal might have to beat each later one. An early decision might preclude some later proposals. So “**stacking the agenda**” can help or hurt proposals.  Other meetings discuss the rival options all at once. But often some members express **no backup choices**. So similar options split supporters and hurt each other. Then a minority pushing 1 option can appear to be the strongest group. Even sadder, a member with a well-balanced option but few eager supporters might drop it.  Too often, a committee chooses all the parts in a bill. Other members can say only yes or no to that **bundle**.  **Rigged votes** often build bad policy and animosity.  To reduce these risks, let the voters rank more options.1  It is often an easy improvement to try. See page 38*!*  **Ballot On Issue A**  **1**  **Rank Option** 1 2    3  Continue Discussion    2  Original Bill, the main motion    1  Bill with Amendment 1 (a free rider?)    8  Bill with Amend. 2 (a wrecking amend.?)    7  Bill with Amendments 1 and 2    4  Postpone for   7  days    5  Refer the Bill to a Committee    6  No Change (a vote for gridlock exposed?)  An “Incidental Motion” does not wait for the ballot, *e.g.* a personal complaint or request. 33 |

| More pages in the free eBook. |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 4. Condorcet Tally Centers a Policy  **Games** let us be inside each tally to feel how it works**.**  Two games here show how the Condorcet Tally works.  1) A_In4c Flag L stands at our center, by the median voter. Flags J, K and M surround L, three feet from it.  A_In4cWe asked 9 voters: “Are you closer to J than to K? If so, please raise a hand.” Only one did.  We entered J vs. K, etc. in the pairwise table below.   |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **against** | **J** | **K** | **L** | **M** | | **for J** | — | 1 | 3 | 4 | | **for K** | **8** | 8+1=9 | 4 | **5** | | **for L** | **6** | **5** | — | **5** | | **for M** | **5** | 4 | 4 | 4+5=9 |   **The nine voters gave L a majority over each rival.**  2) A_In4cFlag L has a short Red ribbon and a long Blue one.  A_In4cIf the Red ribbon gets to you, the Red policy gets your vote with its narrow appeal.  A_In4cBut if the Red cannot touch you, the **wide appeal** of the Blue policy gets your vote. Which one wins?  If the flags are places for a heater in an icy cold room:  1. Do we put it at our center or in the biggest group?  2. Do we turn on its fan to spread the heat wide?  3. Do voters on the fringes have any influence?  4. Can the median voter enact any policy alone?  5. Do we get a balanced or a one-sided policy?  *Usually: Blue. Center. Yes. Yes. No. Balanced.* 44 | **Watch Condorcet Find the Center**  This map puts a line halfway between *Al* and a rival. Voters ● on *Al*’s side of each line are closer to *Al*, so they rank *Al* above that rival. The long line has more voters on *Al’s* side than on *Joe’*s. So *Al* wins that test. *Al* wins a very different majority over each rival here. To do that, *Al*'s political positions must be **central** and have **widespread support**, as described on page 31.  In contrast, P-RCV requires the most intense support, first-rank votes, to avoid early elimination. See●page 48.  1-RCV does too, with a high finish line of 50% + 1 vote.  The Condorcet Tally is easy to try ~~in a survey.~~ 56 | Complementing Consensus  Groups that seek consensus on basic agreements  may vote on other issues: They may vote on a detail  like a paint color or on a bunch of optional projects.  Voting only yes or no leads us to discuss and decide one formal “motion” at a time in a very strict sequence.  It stifles the sharing of ideas and development of plans.  But both **consensus** and **ranked choice ballots** let us decide someclosely-related options at the same time. Both reward **blending compatible ideas**. pages 9, [31](#Chairperson) They’re less divisive than yes-or-no voting. " 14[, 45, 56](#BallotScan)  So more members want to help carry out the decision soon and make it work; fewer try to slow it down.  Why Take a Vote  Discussing an issue well often resolves most parts, with mandates up to 100%. Yet we might want to decide some parts with the best voting tools. Why?  The best rules *strengthen* some reasons for voting:  Choice ballots can **speed up meetings**. pages 27, 33  Secret ballots **reduce social pressure** and coercion.  Well-designed ballots and tallies **promote equality**:  Even busy or unassertive people can cast full votes. It is often an easy improvement to try. See page 38  2025, Robert Blair Loring [AccurateDemocracy.com/AcDem.pdf](https://accuratedemocracy.com/AcDem.pdf)  **Free**  [AccurateDemocracy.com/motions.htm](http://accuratedemocracy.com/motions.htm)  Please regift this durable poster. |